CHAPTER 4
Moving to Scale through Government-Led Programs

KEY MESSAGES

Many government programs are at a nascent stage of scaling up. A sustainable approach to scaling up involves careful design across several programmatic and institutional dimensions. This is a critical prerequisite before the expansion of program coverage.

The Partnership for Economic Inclusion (PEI) Landscape Survey 2020 shows that more than 50 percent of existing government-led programs have the potential to cover between 5 and 10 percent of the extreme poor. In these, economic inclusion programs are devised as a discrete intervention, supporting a wider set of policies. In many instances, these programs are underpinning a push toward comprehensive and universal social protection.

Coordination across ministries is necessary to link different complementary programs. Complementarities and convergences help single-ministry programs achieve economies of scale in implementation and strengthen policy coherence.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Documentation of effective operational models and delivery systems in different contexts is required to facilitate effective design and coordination of economic inclusion programming. A wide range of possible configurations of partners, programs, and structures is under way, but there are gaps in documentation and guidance.

Leveraging existing digital infrastructure is critical to strengthen program management and increase efficiency. Digital solutions can help leapfrog some delivery constraints and increase cost-effectiveness, and they will grow in prominence as social distancing restrictions affect training and coaching activities in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.

Market and value chains links can increase the productivity of livelihood activities and bolster program sustainability. Mesolevel links will help alleviate difficult access to markets, infrastructure, and production inputs, and the potential for increased private sector engagement is high.

Introduction

Global discourse on reaching scale with economic inclusion programs is often limited to expanding the number of people served. Yet there are a number of other dimensions of scaling up that need to be factored in for government-led economic inclusion programs to reach scale. This chapter explores the programmatic and institutional aspects of moving to scale. The discussion builds on the political economy discussions in chapter 2.[1]

Many government-led programs are in their infancy, while others are only in early stages of scaling up. As noted in chapter 1, economic inclusion programs at scale tend to be incorporated into broader policy and programming.

As programs mature, it will be important to document and learn from the different ways governments increase coverage and adapt their design and delivery to do so, based on their contexts, maturity of the social protection and other government systems, and level of decentralization. The process will also be influenced locally by how governments are set up, which ministries hold the institutional mandate for social protection, whether a coordination mechanism exists or needs to be created, and a myriad of other contextual considerations. In the years to come, process documentation and operational research will be essential to build a body of knowledge and guidance on how to bring economic inclusion programs most efficiently to scale.

To achieve economic inclusion "at scale," several programmatic and institutional mechanics needed to embed programs in government systems must be considered together with political economy considerations. Table 4.1 outlines the programmatic, institutional, and policy dimensions of scale explored in this report. It is implicit in this framework that implementing at scale requires a systemic and iterative process of adaptation across several dimensions—in program dimensions such as layering of new

TABLE 4.1 Dimensions of Scale: Programmatic and Institutional

Dimensions of scale	Focus	Description	Expected results
Increased coverage	Programmatic aspects	Expansion of programmatic coverage by including more people and/or communities in a given location or replication in different locations.	Improve, widen, and/or deepen program outcomes
Functional expansion		Expansion by increasing the scope of activity, in which a program starts with a single focus but then layers in or links additional multisectoral interventions	
Policy and strategy	Institutional aspects	Institutionalization through policy, strategy, and programming decisions—reinforced by legal, budgetary, and financing decisions to allow effective performance at scale	Improve efficiency; improve fiscal and policy coherence
Organizational		Expansion of organizational coordination and capacity at different levels (central, local, community level); identification of overall governance mechanisms (including cross-ministerial); and engagement of partnerships (including with groups at community level, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], and private sector).	
Operational		Operationalization through building or leveraging delivery systems, especially with respect to digital and community platforms	

Source: World Bank, with adaptations from Carter, Joshi, and Remme 2018; Cooley and Linn 2014.

activities and components, in institutional dimensions such as budgeting, financing, and evolution of digital platforms, to name a few.[2]

Moving to scale will require progress on several dimensions, some of which may be considered important prerequisites to test and adapt before expanding the case load of beneficiaries. A program that has included more people through expansion of coverage geographically may have also implemented system-level changes in government policy, perhaps in partnership with various partners to expand capacity.

In practice, scaling up will be supported through a number of customized programmatic arrangements (FAO 2018; Slater et al. 2016; Soares et al. 2017; Tirivayi, Knowles, and Davis 2013; Maldonado et al. 2016). In an ideal world, economic inclusion programs would be customized and coherent in the context of national policy, organized to overlap and converge with other related programs, and pursued with clear and effective targeting. In practice, economic inclusion programs tend to fall under either of two approaches: single or complementary. A single approach is achieved when additional components are added to a program. This is typical in low-capacity settings, newly initiated approaches, or where government coordination may be especially challenging. A complementary approach coordinates across different programs with a common objective. Complementary approaches are more typical where programs advance and mature or where systems are better established for such coordination.

Programmatic Adaptations to Scale

In order to reach scale, economic inclusion programs need to adapt along a range of programmatic dimensions, including the increase of beneficiary coverage and the expansion of program functions. Among government-led programs, coverage remains modest, but more than one-third of government programs have recently undergone functional expansion, most commonly among social safety net (SSN) programs. Many economic inclusion programs have the potential to scale up.

Increasing coverage refers to scaling-up programs to include more people or communities in a given location or replicating the program in different locations. Beyond coverage expansion, programmatic adaptations to scale up often also involve functional scaling up—increasing the scope of activity, where initially a program starts with a single focus but then layers on or links additional multisectoral interventions.

Increased Coverage

At present, 95 government-led programs in the Partnership for Economic Inclusion (PEI) Landscape Survey 2020—those that shared the number of current beneficiaries—serve over 18 million households, or more than 85 million individuals. This represents an overwhelming majority of the total beneficiaries reached by economic inclusion programs globally (93 percent of both households and individuals).[3]

In terms of the different entry points to scaling up, among government programs, 45 percent of programs featured in the report are classified as SSN programs.[4] SSN programs in the PEI Landscape Survey 2020 account for 58 percent of the total individuals reached, while livelihoods and jobs (L&J) programs make up 53 percent of government-led programs and account for 42 percent of total individuals reached.[5]

Given the targeted nature of economic inclusion programs, the analysis considers "coverage equivalents" across different thresholds—the national poverty line, the extreme poverty line, and the Multidimensional Poverty Index—with each metric providing varying perspectives around poverty.[6] For instance, in Bangladesh, coverage rates of government-led programs are 3 percent relative to total population, 12 percent relative to poverty (as measured by the national poverty line), 20 percent relative to extreme poverty, and 7 percent relative to multidimensional poverty. Note that while the overall analysis covers 53 countries, some metrics report fewer, owing to data gaps. Box 4.1 provides an overview of the methodological approaches in estimating coverage of economic inclusion programs, combined with the challenges that may limit this analysis.

The coverage of government-led programs appears modest relative to total population size but slightly higher when comparing the number of beneficiaries to various poverty lines; in any case, in most contexts there is great potential to scale up.[7] Just one individual program, the Tanzania Productive Social Safety Net, serves slightly more than 10 percent of Tanzania's population. The program scale-up was driven by a strong policy initiative to increase outreach and an effort to decentralize program delivery, which led to broad national coverage. The majority of individual programs serve less than 1 percent of their country's total population (see figure 4.1, panel a). When individual programs are aggregated at the country level—and assuming no overlapping beneficiaries among

BOX 4.1 Estimating Coverage of Economic Inclusion Programs

For this report—based on the Partnership for Economic Inclusion (PEI) Landscape Survey 2020—the "coverage" of a country's economic inclusion programs is considered to be the number of beneficiaries reached by all its programs relative to the total population. The estimates delineate coverage in terms of households (direct beneficiaries) and individuals (direct plus indirect beneficiaries). The individual figure is determined by multiplying direct beneficiaries by average household size. This follows an accepted estimation approach across social protection programs globally (Milazzo and Grosh 2008; Beegle et al. 2018). Estimates do not account for the potential spillover and community effects of an intervention.

Given the tailored nature of economic inclusion programs, the report also considers "coverage equivalents," defined as the number of direct plus indirect beneficiaries reached by a program relative to the total population and estimated poverty thresholds, including the national poverty line, extreme poverty line, and the Multidimensional Poverty Index. These equivalent measures provide important illustrations of the potential coverage of programs that have a strong poverty focus. They also recognize a wider debate on poverty measurement thresholds. However, the approach has shortcomings. The program data provided for this study do not capture beneficiary welfare, so the study could not identify whether reported beneficiaries are poor or not. At best, these figures show the potential scale of programs, if they were perfectly targeted.

Broadly speaking, three challenges limit the analysis: First, there are data gaps, so the information presented should be considered as a lower-bound estimate; just 201 out of 219 programs reported beneficiary data. This points to obvious monitoring gaps in program implementation. Second, in conducting this study, PEI drew on census information to determine average household size. This may underestimate the true nature of coverage, since poorer households are usually larger than average. Also, this level of disaggregated information was not systematically available for all countries. Third, PEI did not account for potential overlaps across programs. To minimize the risk of overlap, PEI cross-checked its own survey data with government administrative data, when possible, and made the decision to report on individuals, whether indirect or direct beneficiaries.

FIGURE 4.1 Distribution of Program Coverage Rates by Share of Population

a. Based on four alternative measures (individual government-led programs)



b. Based on four alternative measures (sum of individual government-led programs by country)



Source: Partnership for Economic Inclusion, World Bank.

Note: NPL = national poverty line; EPL = extreme poverty line; MPI = Multidimensional Poverty Index. The analysis is based on 95 government-led programs (those providing data on the number of beneficiaries), representing 53 countries. Data are presented by program and aggregated at the country level. The poverty headcount is missing for seven countries using the purchasing power parity (PPP) $1.90 per day line or extreme poverty line, and eight countries using the MPI. This figure assumes perfect targeting.

programs—22 out of 53 countries have coverage of between 1 and 5 percent of the total population, as shown in figure 4.1, panel b.

The scale of economic inclusion interventions is modest in part because they began recently and in part because they are most relevant for the poorest subset of the population. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have a large number of people living in poverty, which offers great potential to scale up. Although there is a good base of economic inclusion programs operating in many countries in these regions, the aggregated coverage of programs in the majority of these countries ranges from 1 to 5 percent. Four countries in Sub-Saharan Africa—Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda—have programs that build on SSN systems and have managed to achieve coverage greater than 5 percent.

However, expressed as a share of the extreme poor, coverage is slightly higher. The PEI Landscape Survey 2020 shows that 21 countries have the potential to cover between 5 percent and 10 percent of the extreme poor through a combination of existing programs. This presentation of a coverage "equivalent" to extreme poverty provides a more accurate reflection of program objectives and approaches. Economic inclusion programs are devised as discrete interventions, supporting a wider set of policies. In many instances these programs are underpinning a push to comprehensive and universal social protection. As highlighted in box 4.1, although the analysis highlights gaps in coverage, there are strong methodological challenges and assumptions embedded in it.

Many government-led programs surveyed are in the process of expanding coverage, and there is a strong potential to scale up. Fifty-seven percent of these have expanded coverage in the past two years by adding more beneficiaries in a province, region, and/or district or across the country. At present, only 15 percent of government-led programs surveyed operate in a single state or region, while 59 percent serve beneficiaries in multiple states or regions, and a further 26 percent operate nationally. Geographic expansion is largely dependent upon a country's administrative structure and the physical location of target populations. While it is too early to identify trends in economic inclusion programming, there is some evidence that governments are incorporating nongovernment-led programs, which could lead to increased coverage of beneficiaries. For example, in Ethiopia from 2009 to 2011, a small pilot project implemented by the Relief Society of Tigray in the north served as the basis for the design of the government's Household Asset Building Program, which aimed to enhance the productive capacity of the poorest recipients of the public works productive safety net program (PSNP).

Functional Expansion

In the PEI survey, more than a third of the cohort of government-led programs had undergone functional expansion (enhancement of the scope of their activities) in the past two years, often in conjunction with coverage expansion. Scope enhancement was somewhat more common among SSN programs (44 percent) than among L&J programs (26 percent). This is consistent with a growing emphasis on supplementing SSNs with livelihood interventions.

Expanding the scope of a single program is usually a gradual process, with many programs starting with a base intervention and gradually layering interventions. For example, building resilience to climate change became a key rationale for Sahel governments to enhance the scope of their SSNs with elements of adaptive social protection, including economic inclusion (see case study 1). The bundling of multisectoral interventions, a fundamental feature of economic inclusion programming, requires significant administrative capacity. Most SSN programs have added components gradually; in Côte d'Ivoire the Productive Social Safety Net project provided cash transfers to poor households in the first year of operation, introducing additional livelihood interventions only in its third year (World Bank 2015).

While a number of livelihood programs have managed to implement a suite of interventions, others have taken a phased approach to manage complexity at scale. For instance, in India, programs like the Andhra Pradesh Inclusive Growth Project (AGRIGP) and the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project, or JEEViKA, focused initially on developing self-help groups and other community-based organizations to promote financial inclusion. In later years, these programs progressively added skills training, livelihood support, and links.

Some programs are expanding the scope of their interventions in response to changing needs and contexts. Several programs reported their plans for increased emphasis on resilience, including SSN programs like the upcoming Mali Access to Finance and Income Generating Opportunities Project. Other programs increased their emphasis on market development, including L&J programs like Argentina's Proyecto de inclusión socio-económica en áreas rurales, Bolivia's Rural Alliances Project, and India's AGRIGP for small farmers and producers.

In certain countries, functional expansion takes the form of program convergence, in which components of two or more existing discrete programs serve the same group of beneficiaries. For instance, in Brazil, the Acre Social and Economic Inclusion and Sustainable Development Project provides coordinated interventions to the poor in one state, including cash transfers (Bolsa Família), health, agroforestry production systems, and agricultural extension services (World Bank 2008). Similarly, in India, JEEViKA leverages its community-based structure to link participants to SSN, agriculture, enterprise development, skills training, and financial inclusion programs. In Panama, the pilot Productive Inclusion Program in indigenous territories is part of broader economic inclusion programming and is linked with the cash transfer program Red de Oportunidades. Ideally, this type of complementary program would introduce links and referrals across existing programs. This type of link would ideally help improve existing delivery platforms. In practice, however, varying levels of policy coherence and coordination determine whether this approach is effective in delivering a suite of interventions.

Institutional Adaptations to Scale

Institutional, policy, strategy, organizational, and operational settings influence whether an economic inclusion program scales up or not. Today, through system-level changes, such as in policy or budgeting, small-scale programs are being institutionalized. Institutionalization might happen by including a small-scale pilot or program in government policy and financing, expanding organizational capacity (either in-house or through partnerships), or building delivery systems or utilizing existing systems, depending on the context. An example of institutionalization is the Adaptive Social Protection Program in the Sahel. This program was launched in March 2014 to support the design and implementation of adaptive social protection programs and systems in six Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal). The program entails a combination of policies and interventions to help poor and vulnerable households build resilience, reduce the impact of climatic change and other shocks, and foster access to income-earning opportunities. The social protection programs use existing SSNs as a base on which to build complementary activities, with a strong focus on training in basic skills and livelihood diversification, sanitary and health practices, and nutrition awareness.

A number of small-scale pilots or programs, including those led by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are also being institutionalized through policy, programming, legal, budgetary, or other system-level changes. For example, the organization Fonkoze has institutionalized the Chemin Lavi Miyò program in Haiti as the primary way to work with poorest beneficiaries. As their incomes and assets grow, participants can access some of the organization's other services, in particular, microfinance. And the Ghana Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) program builds on a series of smaller pilots, including one that for almost a decade has been testing ways to increase access to income-generating activities for extremely poor households. This process of institutionalization helps expand the understanding of scaling-up beyond just programmatic aspects and acknowledges that institutional and political settings influence whether a program will scale up or not. Organizational capacity and robust delivery systems are also critical dimensions of effective scale up.

Policy and Strategy Adaptations

Economic inclusion programs often have a strong link to national policy and strategy frameworks. Seventy-six percent of the programs in the survey are integrated with a government program or a government strategy or policy pertaining to growth, poverty reduction, social protection and labor, migration and forced displacement, recovery and resilience, or agriculture and rural development. Ministries that typically lead government economic inclusion programs are ministries of development and planning (17 percent), ministries of social development and protection (26 percent), labor (15 percent), agriculture (12 percent), finance (9 percent), and environment (6 percent).

In the past two years, 33 percent of government-led programs surveyed have adapted institutionalization structures, illustrating the current policy momentum for this agenda. Programs that are scaling up institutionally are often strongly linked to national policy and strategy frameworks. For example, the Satat Jeevikoparjan Yojana (SJY) scale-up in Bihar, India, as highlighted in case study 2, benefits from being integrated into a larger institutionalized economic inclusion effort: JEEViKA at the state level and the National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM) at the national level. SJY is strongly aligned to state- and national-level policy objectives and is considered a key piece of JEEViKA's overall policy goal of "saturation," that is, inclusion of and service provision for the poor. SJY's scale-up benefits from state and national funding, and JEEViKA's well-developed and adaptive delivery systems and infrastructure, all of which have supported an altogether new programmatic approach. NRLM, having been conceptualized at the national level based on the lessons of JEEViKA and similar programs in other states, offers a broad landscape in which to institutionalize the experiences of SJY at a national scale.

Rwanda's Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP), introduced in 2008, combines public works with financial support in the form of transfers, financial literacy training, and credit. There was strong high-level commitment to the program, which was due to the convergence of interests around the view that persistent poverty and inequality directly created political instability. As a result, the VUP became an integral part of the government's development strategy, with public financing constituting a significant portion of the cost and expanding program coverage to roughly 6 percent of the population (Lavers 2016). Approximately 45 percent of programs led by the ministries of labor and development and planning have adapted institutional structures in the process of scale-up.

Financing is an important part of sustainability, and it links to political economy decisions, discussed in chapter 2. Over half (55 percent) of programs surveyed led by governments are also funded in whole (29 percent of these) or in part (71 percent) by them, with 36 countries having dedicated budget lines for expenditures in this area. Furthermore, the majority of programs in ministries of labor (69 percent of government-led programs), agriculture (58 percent), development and planning (61 percent), and social development and protection (60 percent) have a dedicated budget line for economic inclusion programming. This demonstrates a high level of government ownership and commitment to this agenda. For example, Peru's Haku Wiñay is a government-funded program with an established budgetary line and resources offering greater fiscal continuity. As a result, it has been institutionalizing as it rolled out systematically to different parts of Peru over the years (see case study 4). Survey data disaggregated by region reveal that 92 percent of programs in Latin America and the Caribbean receive government funding, whereas in Sub-Saharan Africa only about 31 percent receive government funding. Of those government-led programs that have institutionalized in the past two years, 63 percent have received government funding. In terms of entry points to scale, 56 percent of SSN and 54 percent of L&J programs have acquired government funding.

At the same time, donor financing has an important role to play, both by filling financing gaps and because of the associated technical expertise that accompanies such financing. The funding that underpins the efforts of those programs surveyed is often provided by a mix of donors, the most prevalent being multilateral agencies, which fund most economic inclusion programs (71 percent of all programs and 79 percent of government-led programs), including the World Bank, multilateral organizations such as the European Union and United Nations agencies, and bilateral agencies like the United Kingdom's Department for International Development, the US Agency for International Development, Ireland's IrishAID, and Germany's Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).[8] The World Bank is financing 37 percent of all economic inclusion programs, mostly government-led programs.[9] For example, in Bihar the national and state governments, World Bank, catalytic philanthropic funding for technical assistance, and research support have combined synergistically to support SJY (see case study 2).

Organizational Adaptations

Most programs that have expanded in size and scope have also expanded their organizational capacity. Bundling multisectoral interventions requires that all the government agencies involved have significant administrative capacity and clear institutional mandates. Over the past two years, 41 percent of government programs surveyed have expanded their organizational capacity. This might be by increasing in-house capacity or through partnerships with other institutions, depending on the context. In Peru, the Haku Wiñay program uses expert farmers called *yachachiq*, who advise and help the program participants in the improvements of their farming techniques. The profile of these yachachiq varies from region to region, but they are often young peasants who have previously worked in NGO projects or in other social programs and therefore can provide advice and guidance to their neighbors. Their presence in the communities has alleviated the need to identify or procure a third-party partner organization to deliver the coaching component (see case study 4). Although it is an NGO program, Fonkoze in Haiti provides an interesting example of organizational scaling. Fonkoze determined that safe housing was an essential part of their Chemen Lavi Miyò economic inclusion program because leaky roofs hindered the economic progress of beneficiaries. The organization's entrepreneurial culture led them to offer construction training and deliver basic materials to participants despite those elements not being initially part of the organization's mandate (de Montesquiou and Sheldon 2018).

Economic inclusion packages are bundled together in different ways: some bundles are provided by one program only (single programs) while other bundles are knitted together by linking several programs (complementary programs). Roughly 76 percent of government-led programs in the survey are single programs. In some instances, single programs may also choose to refer program participants to additional services provided by organizations outside the program, such as referring people for health care provision, but the core economic inclusion package is still provided through the program, including through partner organizations. Among government programs, 69 percent of SSN programs and 81 percent of L&J programs are single programs in the survey.

Complementary programs face the challenges of policy coherence in program design and effective coordination during implementation. In most cases, despite stated intentions and agreements, the synergies between programs are typically not well articulated in policy, program design, or implementation. Some countries are working to deepen coordination across programs, as Brazil did with its Brasil Sem Miséria program, in which respective ministries had integrated their registries to achieve better joint-targeting programs, such as the Bolsa Família (conditional cash transfer), Promotion of Rural Productive Activities (Fomento cash grant), the Bolsa Verde (grants in the Amazon forest), and Cisternas (access to water facilitation to rural activities).[10]

The majority of complementary programs in the survey are led by governments (57 percent). These are coordinated interventions built on existing systems and programs, which may be helping to avoid duplication of government interventions and to improve efficiencies. In many cases, despite good intentions and formalized agreements, coordination between programs remains difficult: governments need to focus on strengthening operational capacity and effective coordination in order to do this effectively (GIZ 2017). In Chile, the Ministry of Social Development takes the lead in coordinating the delivery of a range of social services and benefits provided by different government institutions under the Programa Familias for the poorest and most vulnerable. In Indonesia, the Ministry of Social Affairs is also working to integrate its poverty-targeted programs. Selected recipients of Indonesia's conditional cash transfer program (Program Keluarga Harapan) are encouraged to join either the Kelompok Usaha Bersama Program (a business entrepreneurship program through which families receive support to set up sustainable microenterprises) or the new social entrepreneurship program Kewirausahaan Sosial or both. The goal is to create a ladder of support to foster the further development of microbusinesses with higher potential.

Forging partnerships with NGOs and the private sector (including financial services providers) for program delivery is critically important for economic inclusion programs. Box 4.2 discusses some of the key roles NGOs play in program design and implementation. The complexity of bundled interventions makes it difficult for a single agency to deliver them. It is also inefficient for a single agency to do so, except in fragile or conflict- or violence-affected settings, where there are serious service delivery gaps. Among the government-led programs in the survey, 67 percent partner with NGOs and 63 percent with the private sector for implementation, financing, and technical support. Eighty-seven percent of government programs surveyed are supported by donors (such as the World Bank). The most common roles for NGO and private sector partners are providing technical assistance and the delivery of components. Regular performance evaluation of partners such as NGOs and private sector service providers is an essential part of efficient implementation and can be nurtured through performance-based contracting.

Lead organizations often partner with other organizations or actors to implement program components, bring in specialized expertise, and overcome capacity constraints. These partners are mostly NGOs, community members, and governments at different levels. In Brazil, the World Bank–supported Bahia Sustainable Rural Development Project is working to scale up productive alliances, better integrate with the market at both the private and institutional levels, and strengthen the contribution of other public sector institutions and policies. In the Sahel, the governments partnered with Trickle Up both for the design of the program and for the delivery phase, sometimes also including communities through group formations and community agents to deliver the programs.

Government-led programs may rely more on other implementing partners than nongovernment-led programs. This is partly because national governments may

BOX 4.2 Beyond Direct Delivery: NGOs as Catalyzers for Scale

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) implement nearly half of all economic inclusion programs worldwide, but serve only 7 percent of beneficiaries. However, coverage data must not minimize the critical role NGOs play in the scaling up of economic inclusion programs.

First, some NGOs directly implement programs at a very large scale. Examples include BRAC's Ultra-Poor Graduation Program, Village Enterprise's Kenya Core Programming, and World Vision's Livelihood Technical Program. This is true especially in fragile and conflict- or violence-affected settings, as is the case with Concern Worldwide's Building Resilient Communities in Somalia, and Humanity and Inclusion's Alliance for Community Resilience program (with a consortium of seven NGOs) in West Africa.

Program design support. Beyond direct implementation, there are several roles that NGOs play. They provide extensive support to the design of government programs with technical assistance. This provision of multiyear technical support and capacity building to governments is accelerating the pace at which governments are adopting economic inclusion programs and is catalyzing a new wave of adaptive learning.

Program delivery support. NGOs also frequently support governments in delivering economic inclusion programs: 67 percent of governments surveyed partner with NGOs for this purpose. Depending on government capacity levels in a country, NGOs may take on different parts of program delivery. For example, in the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program, Trickle Up helps the government hire and train frontline staff in some regions, while directly implementing coaching components in lower-capacity regions. In Bihar, the Indian NGO Bandhan Konnagar provides technical support to JEEViKA, the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project, to help it adapt and roll out the approach of Satat Jeevikoparjan Yojana (SJY). Both examples are highlighted in this publication's case studies.

Documenting and testing innovations. When providing technical assistance or implementing programs, NGOs are often at the forefront of documenting country-level innovations, helping to fill some global knowledge gaps. Some NGOs are testing innovations aimed at right-sizing economic inclusion package components. For example, in Kenya, Village Enterprise has recently completed a randomized controlled trial demonstrating successful results of a low-cost economic inclusion package. The BOMA Project and Concern Worldwide are testing innovations in delivery mechanisms in East Africa. Such lessons are critical to helping governments around the globe adapt programs to their country context and their current and expected future fiscal space.

Building capacity. NGOs often help to build capacity in the government programs they support through design, delivery, and technical assistance. BRAC, Fundación Capital, Trickle Up, and other providers of technical assistance to governments play a key role in delivering training and drafting tools and technical guides to help governments in their economic inclusion programming.

Pioneering new funding mechanisms. Finally, by pioneering innovative funding mechanisms, some NGOs are engaging new funders in the field. For example, in 2017, Village Enterprise mobilized funding for an economic inclusion program through a development impact bond in Uganda. This pioneering effort was followed by significant investment from various donors and philanthropists, who were keen to learn about the effectiveness of outcome-based funding mechanisms to leverage additional funding for scaling up. More work is needed in terms of understanding how government systems can make use of these new funding mechanisms.

not be best suited to beneficiary-level work. In fact, they often rely on regional and local governments, NGOs, or private-sector organizations to undertake the program activities that involve individual beneficiaries, such as program targeting, delivery of program components, and beneficiary monitoring.[11] Figure 4.2 offers a breakdown of the roles played by the lead government agency and partner organizations in government-led programs.

Operational Adaptations

To reduce cost and facilitate links with other social policy, a number of economic inclusion programs leverage existing delivery systems (see chapter 6). Thirty-three percent of all programs surveyed and 43 percent of government-led programs are currently utilizing government social registries, beneficiary registries, and other government databases to identify program participants. Among government-led programs, this is more common in programs operating in the regions of Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia (62 percent and 40 percent, respectively) than it is in those in Sub-Saharan Africa (27 percent). Using a government registry is also more common in government programs that have an SSN as an entry point (58 percent) than in those with L&J as the entry point (32 percent). In addition, government programs use information systems across the program delivery chain to advance implementation on the ground and support overall program management (figure 4.3, panel a).

Digital technology is utilized in 85 percent of all government-led programs surveyed.[12] Data digitization increases transparency and accountability in service

FIGURE 4.2 Percentage of Government-Led Programs Where the Lead Government Agency Plays Selected Roles



Source: Partnership for Economic Inclusion, World Bank.

Note: Percentage of all government-led programs (N = 107). Both the lead government agency and other partners can play the same role in the same program.

FIGURE 4.3 **Digital Technology: Percentage of Government-Led Programs Using Digital Technology for Program Management and Delivery**



Source: Partnership for Economic Inclusion, World Bank.

Note: Panel a shows percentages of all government-led programs (N = 107). Panel b shows percentages of government-led programs providing components digitally (N = 32). Multiple responses were possible.

delivery and makes data-driven decision-making possible for governments. Several programs expressed the need for robust and responsive market information systems, including the Mozambique Social Protection Project, Nigeria Youth Employment and Social Support Operation, and the Mexico Social Protection System Project. Regionally, the use of digital technology is immensely popular in South Asia and is almost equally as important in Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Government complementary programs are more likely than single interventions, among those surveyed, to leverage digital technologies for overall program management and monitoring (77 percent and 63 percent, respectively). Information systems also facilitate information exchange and coordinated delivery across government agencies and nongovernment implementing partners. This is vitally important for economic inclusion programs that combine multiple interventions. However, the use of digital technologies also poses new challenges in terms of building capacity, integrating information systems, and ensuring data protection.

Apart from aiding management and monitoring, digital technology plays a growing role in the direct delivery of services. Thirty percent of government-led programs use digital technology to deliver at least one intervention, such as electronic payments, digital financial services, e-coaching, and e-training (see figure 4.3, panel b). With the exception of skills training, government programs use digital technologies at higher rates than nongovernment programs, especially in delivering transfers or financial support, access to savings, and market information.

The rapid diffusion of new mobile and internet technologies also presents an opportunity to utilize technological innovations to reach beneficiaries. However, digital divides may remain across location, income groups, gender, and age; economic inclusion beneficiaries are less likely to be connected or familiar with digital interfaces. The use of technology needs to be balanced with the need to reach those offline.

Operations: Leveraging Community Structures for Program Delivery

Seventy-three percent of government-led programs included in the survey utilize community structures, including local governance groups (65 percent), formalized producer organizations (53 percent), and informal community savings and credit groups (39 percent). Community structures may be engaged in program delivery, including for training, coaching, and savings facilitation (see figure 4.4). Whether the economic inclusion programs are primarily at the household or individual level, community mobilization components allow programs to build agency and to support program implementation. Engaging the community in a program's implementation can help generate change at the community level. By creating opportunities for social interaction, programs build social capital and influence attitudes and behaviors across social and economic domains. This potentially can generate spillover effects for the broader community, amplifying and sustaining program impact. When the poor have limited social networks to start with, interventions that support the formation of peer groups, profitable social bonds, and cooperative arrangements can yield concrete economic returns (Macours and Vakis 2014; Blattman et al. 2016).

Eighty-six percent of government programs that leverage community structures also support the development of these community platforms, either by developing new structures or strengthening existing ones. Government programs that support the development of producer organizations in their efforts to integrate participants with markets are more likely to leverage community structures than programs that do not (94 percent versus 68 percent). For example, JEEViKA relies on a large cadre of community members trained to support programming efforts. These grassroots women leaders serve as paraprofessionals, resource persons, and functionaries trained in the areas of institutional capacity building, community mobilizing, bookkeeping, and providing links with commercial banks and livelihood support services.[13]

FIGURE 4.4 **Percentage of Program Components Implemented through Community Groups or Structures**



Source: Partnership for Economic Inclusion, World Bank.

Note: Percentage of government programs leveraging community structures (N = 78).

Village organizations enable JEEViKA to extend a host of livelihood supports, including grants to support farmer producer groups mobilized across self-help groups, community-level poultry units, and greenhouses. They also enable initiatives to promote community health; water access, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) practices; and a host of other services (see case study 2). In Peru, Haku Wiñay is implemented with the support of *executing nuclei*—groups of 80 to 100 rural households. The nuclei have communal legitimacy because they are integrated with and directed by members of the community (see case study 4).

Future Directions

Many government-led economic inclusion programs are at a nascent stage of implementation and must refine their policies and strategies in order to scale up. Scaling up entails not just a simple increase in coverage but a flexible process by which governments develop economic inclusion programs along programmatic and institutional priorities. There are multiple dimensions to consider in order to reach scale; understanding this can dramatically increase the number of people served.

The number of participants served will grow as national economic inclusion programs scale up, but they will eventually plateau, because the programs are designed to serve a subset of the population. These programs are only a part of a wider set of a government policy and underpin a push toward comprehensive and universal social protection. Despite the growth in economic inclusion programming by governments, the scale of these programs is still relatively small compared to need. At present, the PEI survey shows over 50 percent of existing government-led programs have the potential to cover 5 percent to 10 percent of the extreme poor.

Coordination across ministries is necessary to link complementary programs. Complementarities and convergences help single-ministry programs to achieve economies of scale in implementation and strengthen policy coherence. Bundling interventions requires significant administrative capacity, and most programs that have expanded in size and scope have also expanded their organizational capacity. Programmatic adaptations are typically accompanied by some form of institutional adaptation. Depending on context, these include small-scale pilots or programs in government policy and financing, expanding organizational capacity (either in-house or through partnerships), and building delivery systems or leveraging existing systems.

Successful government-led interventions require strong local partnerships. Documentation of good practice in effective government-NGO collaboration can catalyze innovation and learning. Forty-one percent of government programs have expanded their organizational capacity over the past two years, for example, by increasing in-house capacity through partnerships with other institutions. Community structures may be engaged in program delivery, including for training, coaching, and savings facilitation.

Documentation of effective operational models and delivery systems in different contexts is required to facilitate effective design and coordination of economic inclusion programming. With a wide range of possible configurations of partners, programs, and structures under way, documentation and guidance is a gap. Documenting the programmatic and operational lessons from these government programs as they scale up will allow for an increased understanding of how to efficiently reach scale depending on context, administrative structure, capacity, and fiscal resources.

Leveraging existing digital infrastructure is critical to strengthen program management and increase efficiency. Digital solutions can help leapfrog some delivery constraints and increase cost-effectiveness, and they will grow in prominence as social distancing restrictions affect training and coaching activities in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Thirty percent of government-led programs provide access to program components through digital platforms, but digital divides still remain across location, income groups, gender, and age.

Market and value chain links can increase productivity of livelihood activities and bolster program sustainability. Mesolevel links will help alleviate difficult access to markets, infrastructure, and production inputs, and the potential for increased private sector engagement is high. Moving forward it will be important to understand how L&J interventions can be further scaled up, reducing the barriers for very poor and vulnerable people to enter job markets. Community-based development approaches and other sectoral interventions (such as agricultural development programs) might also provide opportunities to foster synergies among poverty reduction programs.

Notes

1. For the purposes of this chapter, all descriptions and figures related to economic inclusion programs refer to those programs included in the Partnership for Economic Inclusion (PEI) Landscape Survey 2020, or a subset of those programs, if so indicated.
2. Adapted from Uvin 1995, cited in Hartmann and Linn 2008.
3. Beneficiary data are based on 94 of the 106 government-led programs in 53 countries. Twelve programs did not report beneficiary numbers. The analysis of program coverage excludes data from JEEViKA, which is an outlier program in the overall sample.
4. This report identifies three entry points: social safety nets, livelihoods and jobs, and financial inclusion. These are the foundational interventions on which economic inclusion programs are built.
5. This excludes data from JEEViKA, which is an outlier program in the overall sample.
6. The Multidimensional Poverty Index measures the prevalence of poverty based on indicators that go beyond monetary metrics and span three dimensions: health, education, and standard of living. The Multidimensional Poverty Index is developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative at the University of Oxford.
7. The coverage analysis is based on 95 of the 107 government-led programs in 53 countries. Twelve programs did not report beneficiary numbers.
8. This is based on 217 out of the 219 surveyed programs that provided data on the level and the type of organization financing the economic inclusion program.
9. Much of the World Bank financing is in the form of loans to governments, thus this figure also includes funding that will ultimately be provided to the beneficiaries by the recipient governments. The World Bank is made up of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). These two institutions provide different types of lending instruments to countries based on income category. IBRD lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries. IDA provides interest-free loans—called credits—and grants to governments of the poorest countries. On occasion, countries may be eligible to receive financing from both lending sources, called blended finance. Of World Bank–financed economic inclusion programs, 57 percent are IDA, 29 percent are IBRD, and 12 percent are blended. The remaining 2 percent of programs are in locations that do not fit into a lending category: West Bank and Gaza, Cyprus, and Sint Maarten (Dutch part).
10. The Brasil Sem Miséria strategy was discontinued following the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016.
11. The survey asked programs to indicate which organizations, apart from the lead organization, perform the main roles. There were initially significant errors and inconsistencies in how programs responded to these questions. While the Partnership for Economic Inclusion management team followed up with programs to clarify some of these issues, this section presents broad trends rather than actual percentages, as these may not accurately represent the extent to which different organizations play the various roles captured through the survey.

12. The survey asked programs to indicate the activities undertaken using digital technologies. This figure represents the percentage of programs that use digital technologies for any program activity.
13. As of 2019, community institutions were staffed by more than 120,000 trained community professionals and resource persons in cadres of specialized staff, all from the local area.

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